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Abstract: 
This paper is premised on the notion that actors play a central role in shaping their institutional 
contexts. The paper adds to scholarship in this area by bringing together three disparate cases 
with a common analytical entry point: the city region. Despite their multiple scales and different 
sites of governance, these cases are united by a common theme, exemplified in each city region: 
addressing the contradictions of rapid development, in particular rapid growth and 
competitiveness. Using the conceptual framework of interpretive institutionalism we examine 
how dilemmas, in this case the pressure of rapid growth in regions, are informed by the different 
traditions for understanding the role of the market in delivering project outcomes. Our findings 
show this difference in institutional norms and the variance amongst the different paradigms. 
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Introduction 
For some time, economic geographers have understood that what drives human motivation is not 
necessarily informed solely by assumptions of the profit maximizing rational actor. For them, 
economic norms are embedded in culture and vary among different places and times (Barnes, 
1996; Gertler, 2003; Peck, 2010). Economic norms are thus concrete and empirically observable. 
For instance, Polanyi argued that economic decision-making is embedded in, and structured and 
guided by, formal and informal patterns, or institutions. Using a Polanyian lens, Peck (2013) 
argues that institutions are not universal, but culturally created through tensions embedded in 
different places and times. Following North (2015: 309), “economic life does not stand apart 
from, but is an adaptation to and embedded in, wider environmental, societal, and material 
conditions”. Interpretive institutionalism takes a holistic view of meanings and locates them in a 
wider web of such meanings (Bevir and Rhodes 2006).  In this paper we bring the framework of 
interpretive institutionalism, with its relational approach to dilemmas, traditions, and beliefs, to 
bear on these approaches within economic geography.  In doing so, the contribution of this paper 
is to show clearly the nuances that cultural embeddedness brings to the regulatory function of the 
market.  
 Copyright © 2018 Sage. Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications.
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Interpretive institutionalism, which was developed in political science by Mark Bevir and 
Roderick Rhodes (2001), can bring valuable insights into the dynamics of how actors draw upon 
their milieu to shape institutional responses to problems (or in their language ‘dilemmas’) such 
as reconciling sustainability and markets through their traditions and beliefs. This framing of 
institutions comes from an interest in institutional formation outside the geographical political 
economy literature. In some studies of institutions, institutional form tends to be separated from 
the actors who inhabit them in a search for a deductive link between institutional form and 
function. For example, in the policy studies literature ‘rational choice institutionalism’ maintains 
a dominant hold on institutional theory (Durant, 2006). Here, scholars rely on the “inviolable” 
assumption of neoclassical economics - that bureaucrats are rational actors acting in their own 
self-interest, which is institutional preservation. Regardless, embedded approaches have 
emerged. A study by Zegart (1999) focused on the strategic role of bureaucrats in the alignments 
and realignment of governmental institutions (see also Krause and Meier, 2005). Similarly, 
Durant (2006: 470) noted that such “studies find that bureaucrats act strategically to influence 
agency design and evolution; they are not passive bystanders who are merely ‘acted upon’ as 
most conventional principal-agent models assume.” In the British politics literature, a networks 
approach is a common analytical tool for measuring institutional change. Here the concept of 
embeddedness is critical, thus the role of cultural norms and institutional structures are vital for 
exploring social life (Bevir, 2006; Coaffee and Healey, 2003). Where some might opt for 
upholding assumptions about utility maximizing actors, these social scientists argue that agents 
are embedded in institutions and that networks are key drivers in policy expressions and 
outcomes, which are contingent and often unintended. For example, Rhodes (1997) found that 
neo-liberal reforms in Britain during the 1980s fragmented service-delivery, thereby weakening 
central control because they did not establish proper markets, revealing the unintended 
consequences of policy implementation at a bureaucratic and governance level. In short, an 
interpretive institutionalist approach suggests that institutional forms and models alone cannot 
reveal institutional functionality (or dysfunctionality).  Only when we study beliefs and practices 
as mutually constitutive of one another can we begin to do so. 
 
Bevir and Rhodes’ work has opened up the black box of institutions to show how these factors, 
held by a broad coterie of economic actors, shape institutions, and, in relation to the focus of this 
paper, market-oriented policies for addressing rapid growth. This work fits with the Polanyian 
perspective in that it captures the tensions referred to by Peck (2013). As with the case of  
cultural economic geography, which has made linguistic (Gibson-Graham 1996), historical 
(Barnes 1996), and pragmatist turns (Barnes and Sheppard 2013), interpretative institutionalism 
examines patterns of human behaviour as they shape the very policy contexts in which they exist.  
Relying on a conceptual framework that privileges actors affords a tighter focus on how 
economic life is shaped by those actors seeking to make sense of the world around them. It is 
similar to interpretative policy analysis in that it challenges the top-down, instrumental rational 
model of policy-making and implementation.  For Yanow (2017; 403) interpretative policy 
analysis asks not only “what a policy means but how policies mean –questions about process by 
which meanings are communicated”.  While interpretative institutionalism can examine, say, the 
land use planning policies of the UK central government (see below), the focus remains on the 
actors within institutions and how they make sense of their policy context.. For us a key 
distinction between interpretative policy analysis and interpretative institutionalism is that the 
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latter focuses primarily on the conditions of policy development, where the former often focuses 
on implementation. 
 
In this paper, we employ three concepts (dilemmas, traditions, and beliefs—see below), though 
primarily the first two because of the nature of the study, to explore three very different 
responses to the same problems (or dilemmas) of rapid development in three dynamic economic 
spaces - Boston city-region, London and South East England, and the cross-border 
agglomeration of Luxembourg. While the narratives that are associated with each case reflect the 
similarities of the dilemmas facing these three locations, differing traditions and beliefs have led 
to different policy and institutional outcomes. From this, we can see how actors in different 
places understand the mechanics of economic competition and growth differently and seek to 
regulate them accordingly. Our cases were chosen because they represent three dynamic and 
rapidly changing city regions that are regulated at a variety of spatial scales, yet where the 
process of ‘meaning making’ is not so different. Whether local government in Boston, devolving 
central government in the UK, or the strong regulatory state in Luxembourg, actors take on broad 
narratives of rapid development, develop potential responses to it, and shape them in their own 
interpretivist way. The paper therefore contributes to the literature on cultural embeddedness and 
interpretative policy analysis in that it provides a robust conceptualization for how actors 
borrowing from their worlds deploy more general mobilized ideas and ideologies. 
 
To make this argument our paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we examine interpretive 
institutionalism and its conceptual contributions that add to cultural theories of economy. In the 
following two sections, we examine issues related to the rapid growth of competitive city regions 
and the policies that different places have sought to ameliorate these issues and then describe the 
methods we used to collect the data for the case studies. The next section provides details and 
analysis of our case studies. Finally, we pull the argument together in a concluding section. 
 
Interpretive Institutionalism 
 
Institutions are entities with social origins and underlying ideologies. As several scholars have 
noted, current neoliberal institutions have their roots in earlier social histories (Mansfield, 2004; 
Peck, 2010) and ideologies that may contradict current formulations of neoliberalism (Raco, 
2005). The role of ideology in shaping institutional outcomes is an important one. But ideology 
is not employed equally across space, e.g., to pull an analogy from Regulationism: there is not 
just one capitalism, but ‘capitalisms’. A post-structural view of institutions posits that institutions 
are not merely containers of historical perspectives and actions; rather, they focus on the 
dynamic and contingent role of actors in shaping institutional responses (González and Healey, 
2005; Irazábal, 2005). This analytical approach addresses what for many is a common problem 
with institutional analyses: it takes ‘institutions for granted and treats them as if the people 
within them are bound to follow predetermined procedures or rules, rather than respond to them 
through their own contingent agency’ (Irazábal, 2005: 44). However, ‘ideas on their own cannot 
influence the shape of institutions . . . ideas need carriers—individuals and interest groups — 
who advocate in their favour, and develop strategies for their promotion’ (Lowndes, 2005: 297). 
Actors shape outcomes and agendas through struggle, conflict, encounter, and resistance 
(González and Healey, 2005; Lowndes, 2005). Here institutional analysis can be exposed to 
sources of power, gender inequality, the politics of science, and the like. 
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Interpretive institutionalism provides a framework to examine the way institutions are created, 
sustained or modified through the ideas and actions of individuals (Bevir 1999). The actions of 
individuals are therefore not governed by their institutional position or institutional rules; rather, 
the analytical lens focuses on ‘how meanings and actions, are created, recreated and changed in 
ways that produce and transform institutions’ (Bevir, 2003: 460). Economic actors and firms, for 
example, create institutions as a set of broader social processes as well as the agency of actors 
working to construct them and act through them. Institutions can be seen not only as 
administrative and political organizations, but also as ‘the rules, norms and practices, which 
structure areas of social endeavour’ (Coaffee and Healey, 2003: 1982). Hence, ‘institutional rules 
may be consciously designed and clearly specified (as in structural plans and operating 
procedures) or take the form of unwritten customs and conventions (as in aspects of 
‘professionalism’ or ‘departmentalism’)’ (Lowndes and Wilson, 2001: 632). Bevir’s (1999) 
analysis of the New Labour Party in the UK, for example, shows that New Labour appealed to 
the discourse of socialism in terms of its core values, but sought new ways of realizing those 
values in the context of the changing circumstances of the 1990s. As a rhetorical move this may 
have been New Labour’s goal, yet, as a political analysis, socialism remained a trans-historical 
account of “human nature” with temporally fixed ethical commitments. In this case, then, 
socialism is a fixed, trans-historical object of analysis set against a backdrop of particular 
contexts. For Bevir, a non-reified model of ideology refuses to ascribe to it an existence of the 
particular beliefs and actions of individuals (Bevir, 1999). 
 
This argument and evidence suggests that a more nuanced understanding of those contemporary 
institutions, the scale of which is contingent (see below), responsible for addressing the 
dilemmas of rapid growth is warranted to understand the specific policy responses in different 
locations. It renders problematic the notion that institutions arise from ‘given inputs, pressures 
and policies’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2001: 21). According to Bevir and Rhodes (ibid.: 21) 
institutions do not: 
 
arise from given pressures that require movement towards the minimal state, 
marketization, and the new public management. On the contrary, state-actors 
construct both their understanding of the pressures or dilemmas, and also the policies 
they adopt in response to them, in perhaps different ways depending on the 
background of which they do so. 
 
Bevir and Rhodes are ultimately interested in individual political actors and their decision 
making. In this paper, we focus less on how political actors are informed and more with how 
they apply that information and knowledge through institutional practice and thereby mediate 
institutions in ways that might transcend labels such as ‘neoliberal’ or ‘Fordist’. Following 
DiGaetano and Strom (2003: 372) we suggest that ‘political actors are the carriers of culture, and 
their understanding of the structural context and institutional milieu is affected by the values and 
beliefs that they hold’. We are not interested in agency alone, but with how historically and 
culturally embedded actors make sense of the structures around them and forge relationships 
they see as necessary to fulfil their policy goals (Bevir, 2006). Thus, an interpretivist account 
‘encourages us to examine the ways social life, institutions and policies are created, sustained 
and modified by individuals acting upon beliefs that are not given to them by the institution itself 
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or a universal rationality’ (ibid.: 461). In terms of the research presented here, we are interested 
in how different actors, in three different city-regions, have addressed a similar problem or 
dilemma with very different outcomes. In particular, this research gives us the opportunity to 
develop the concept of “traditions” from a geographical perspective.  
 
There are conceptual differences, as well as methodological ones, for analyzing institutions in 
this way. Space prohibits us from covering all these nuances (see Yeung, 2003, for more detail), 
but we do wish to make two distinctions. First, an interpretive analysis of institutions shifts away 
from the meta-narrative in the first instance. Rather, the analytical entry point is like examining 
‘a political contest based on different webs of belief’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2001: 18). 
Commentators from a Marxist and regulationist orientation were critical of the historically 
dislodged concepts of neo-classical economics, such as rational actors, perfect information and 
wealth maximization, complaining of their positivist underpinnings (Barnes, 1996), yet have 
allowed for certain conceptual obfuscations, such as those we have discussed here, to continue. 
This position reflects the sensibility of new economic geography. As Thrift and Olds (1996: 319) 
declare, ‘the very idea of a singular story of an object denoted “economic” is now lost’. 
Moreover, an interpretive analysis requires a closer understanding of actors involved in the 
process transforming the economy-environment relationships involved in urban sustainability. 
An interpretive institutional analysis establishes the internal politics of institutions, as well as the 
external forces that shape them, as an open question. No longer can we accept the position that 
institutions are merely the containers of a regime’s hegemonic ideology. Rather, we need ‘to 
study deeper frames of reference and cultural practices which structure how people make sense 
of their collective worlds and engage cognitively and bodily in their day-to-day routines’ 
(González and Healey, 2005: 2059). Table 1 provides details and definitions of the key elements 
of each analytical concept (see Gibbs and Krueger, 2012; Krueger and Gibbs, 2010, for a more 
detailed discussion). 
 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
 
Policy Responses to Rapid Growing City Regions  
 
In this section of the paper we turn to an examination of our three case study regions. Each of the 
cases presented below represents a city region that has experienced a rapid growth in economic 
activity in recent years and a (perceived at least) decline in competitiveness. While the former 
has brought benefits in terms of growing income (for some) and employment, it has also led to a 
common set of problems. In all three cases, lack of affordable housing and dwindling open space 
were considered to be key policy dilemmas facing the region. These are not the only regions to 
face such concerns, similar concerns exist in Kenya (Midheme and Moulaert, 2013), Tel Aviv, 
(Marom, 2014), Singapore (Olds 2001), Vancouver (Rosol, 2013), Dortmund (Frank, 
forthcoming), Boston (Gibbs and Krueger, 2012), and, of course, throughout China (Chang and 
Sheppard, 2013). For policy makers, one of the key tensions in the management of such growing 
economies is that between maintaining economic competitiveness and preserving the quality of 
life, especially for the kinds of entrepreneurial talent vital for the types of high tech and high 
level service sector activities upon which their economies depend. Thus, key workers in such 
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sectors are particularly sensitive to environmental amenities, services and assets offered in these 
places, as well as access to good schools, health care and the like. By definition, city regions 
with high growth often engender conditions that threaten conditions of social reproduction (Jonas 
et al., 2010). One attempted ‘solution’ to these dilemmas has been for policy makers to adopt 
policies based around the concept of sustainable development which have, for them, attempted to 
reconcile economic development with the preservation of environmental assets. From the late 
1990s onwards, sustainability as a rhetorical strategy became a key part of many city-regions’ 
development strategies. However, the particular form that sustainability took in different 
locations can partially be explained by the political economic positioning of the “sustainable 
city” and the growing view amongst policy makers that the sustainable city can be an engine for 
economic growth (Krueger and Gibbs, 2010; Gibbs and Krueger, 2012). We utilize our three 
case studies to explore in geographic terms how non-market actors, at different spatial scales, 
have exerted power over the sustainable development discourse and linked it to the larger context 
of market-based reform.  Similarly, we employ interpretative institutionalism to show that while 
policy dilemmas may seem the same, in this case rapid growth and stress on housing stock and 
environmental amenities, how different institutions confront these and develop responses can be 
very different.   
 
Methods 
 
While the dilemmas in the case studies are similar in character, the policy responses and 
management forms are decidedly actor informed. For example, the Boston case is focused on 
market-oriented forms of governance, in London and the South East of England power is 
retained by central government, albeit mitigated through housing targets, market based 
incentives, and penalties for local authorities who do not allocate enough land for housing. 
Finally, in Luxembourg, central government maintains significant power by developing a 
traditional command and control regime of governance. These approaches, from neoliberal, to 
third way, to classic state intervention, represent key existing paradigms for land use planning in 
cities around the world. Yet, we cannot assume that these were chosen as part of some sort of 
inherent “maximizing” behaviour. Further, as the cases will illustrate there is no “pure” 
paradigm, they are all mitigated by the traditions and beliefs of key actors involved in developing 
and implementing them. Thus, while the dilemmas are similar, traditions and beliefs are place-
specific, and the actors within these places pick and mix responses based on their own 
understanding of these problems. Thus, we seek to respond to Peck’s (2004) call to move beyond 
specific articulations of neoliberalism to a generalizable approach. For Peck (2004: 399), ``the 
challenge here is to make sense of specific articulations between such local neoliberalisms and 
neoliberalism-in-general, not to privilege a certain kind of transition ... [or] unidirectional 
process of diffusion from dominant `centers' in Chicago or Washington, DC'' (emphasis ours).  
Indeed, our cases provide a detailed examination of how these flows of ideas are transformed 
when they arrive in new policy-state-actor contexts.  
Our research in these areas has been ongoing over a period from 2006 onwards1. In Boston, 
                                                 
1 The interview process took place between 2006-12 and we have continued to monitor these 
places through secondary data analysis.  The interview data collected from 2006-2012 remains 
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interviews were conducted with 15 respondents from the state regulatory authority, regional 
planning boards, NGOs, and key political officials in the Romney Administration. In London and 
the South East, over 20 people were interviewed from central government ministries, (former) 
regional planning bodies, local authorities, professional planners and members of the Town and 
Country Planning Association, as well as the Royal Society of Architects, and the Centre for 
Cities. In Luxembourg, we interviewed 25 people in regional planning agencies, central 
government ministries, national and local NGOs, expert elites in the area of planning and 
development in Luxembourg, and experts from quasi-governmental organizations. In addition, to 
these interviews we have analysed secondary sources, such as white papers, planning policy 
documents, and demographic data. Our research design was iterative in nature. We started the 
research process by educating ourselves through the secondary and grey literatures.  Here we 
examined transcripts of policy debates, white papers, position papers, and the like to understand 
the genre of policy dilemmas, before proceeding to the interview stage. 
 
Case Studies: the problem of rapid growth, environmental degradation, and 
competitiveness 
 
Using the Market to Manage the Boston Region’s Dilemmas from Rapid Growth  
 
The Boston region’s economy is based upon research and development (R&D) in local 
institutions of higher education and health care, as well as the wider services sector. In 
institutionalist terms, the key dilemma that has confronted Boston’s policy makers is how to 
maintain the quality of life that has attracted such new economy firms and their workers, yet at 
the same time deal with the planning consequences (Gibbs and Krueger, 2012; Murphy, 2015). 
In particular, the cost of housing and problems over affordability have forced actors to consider 
the appropriate institutional forms to deal with land use planning problems. Boston’s economic 
success and land use regulation have led to development further and further from the city itself, 
resulting in sprawl and traffic congestion. Sprawl has led to loss of open space and agricultural 
land, and placed severe strain on water availability (Metropolitan Area Planning Council 
(MAPC), 2007). The reconciliation of the two issues of sprawl and housing availability adds 
another layer to the dilemma, as the following quote illustrates: 
 
We live in a very desirable region. The quality of life offered by our historical, 
cultural, natural, and economic attributes continues to retain residents and draw 
increasing numbers of people to make their homes here. As the number of 
households in Metropolitan Boston is rising, we are all – long-time resident and 
newcomer alike – placing increasing demands on the infrastructure that supports 
our quality of life. Indeed, we appear to be jeopardizing many of the attributes 
that drew us here in the first place (MAPC 2006). 
 
While Boston needs more and affordable housing to retain and/or attract new-economy workers, 
this has resulted in suburban sprawl that destroys the sense of place that attracted these same 
firms and workers in the first place. Policy makers in Boston have constructed these dilemmas as 
                                                                                                                                                             
highly relevant as, after the credit crunch, the dilemmas of housing and pressure on green space 
remain in each of these city regions and, if anything, have been exacerbated. 
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being almost entirely economically-driven and about maintaining global competitiveness. 
Concerns over preserving open space and environmental assets are present, but these are framed 
in such a way that they are mainly seen as important for retaining and attracting economic 
activity. As an interview with a high ranking government official attests: 
 
In Massachusetts, the number one issue for employers has been affordable 
housing. This is the top way the business and SG [smart growth] agendas have 
aligned and gone forward together in Massachusetts. Business says they can’t get 
as much house as they’re used to, close in. Some companies won’t relocate here, 
especially those who come from the Southern US. So the smart growth agenda 
has become a housing production agenda, but it’s been to increase housing in 
smart locations: near transit, near downtown. So you increase the supply of 
housing, which will in turn have a moderating effect on housing prices (Interview, 
Romney Advisor, 2006). 
 
Thus the institutional response to these dilemmas has been the adoption of smart growth 
principles intended to allow continued growth and increased housing availability, while 
maintaining the attractiveness of a New England location. Like sustainable development, smart 
growth ‘leverages new growth to improve the community… It also preserves open space and 
many other environmental amenities’ (Anderson, 1998: 4). To accomplish these tripartite goals 
smart growth policies tend to promote development that has the following characteristics: high-
density development around public transport nodes, development that occurs in older suburbs 
and inner cities and mixed land uses (retail, commercial and residential). 
 
However, two particular traditions are important in understanding the ways in which actors have 
framed smart growth responses. These are political fragmentation (or ‘home rule’) and 
affordable housing. First, one of the key issues in the Boston city-region has been to develop a 
region-wide response to the dilemmas and to transcend local traditions of home rule at the 
municipal level. Massachusetts has 351 cities and towns, each with their own land use 
regulations and local governments have broad discretion over zoning and rely heavily on 
property taxes for funding (Horan, 2009). A key institutional response was the initiation of the 
‘MetroFuture’ project in 2002 by the Metropolitan Area Planning Commission (MAPC), the 
regional planning entity for Boston and its 100 surrounding towns. MAPC (2008) makes the 
point that individual responses at the municipal level cannot solve regional problems and that 
cooperative planning at the regional level is the only way to address the scale and complexity of 
the city-region’s problems – the dilemmas involved necessitate a shift in tradition away from 
fragmentation. While for some the tradition of ‘home rule’ needs to be transcended, any attempt 
to modify institutional forms has had to rely on greater engagement with municipalities. 
 
What we are seeing here is that, ‘at the heart of [the] notion of tradition are individuals using 
local reasoning consciously and subconsciously to reflect on and modify their contingent 
heritage’ (Bevir et al, 2003: 109). MetroFuture represents a smart growth approach to break 
down existing local traditions whereby transportation, housing, water resources, health and 
education were considered separately (and often within separate institutional silos) to 
considering these in a holistic and coordinated manner. The MetroFuture regional plan is based 
on smart growth principles involving greater amounts of regional cooperation, directing growth 
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to high density, transit-oriented locations, using brownfields and reducing energy, car and 
resource use (see MAPC, 2008). A director at an NGO, the Arc of Innovation, addresses the 
problem this way: 
 
Sustaining natural resources is crucial to any economic development strategy… 
The Commonwealth and much of the industrialized world have moved from a 
manufacturing to an information based economy; because of this shift knowledge, 
embodied in people, is the new raw material. Knowledge workers value the 
environment as an important quality of life asset and they choose to live in places 
that value it as well. Because workers, with their knowledge and skills, are so 
important in today's economy, firms will locate to these places to tap into their 
talent. A healthy environment and its preservation must be viewed as a key 
component to any comprehensive economic development strategy (ARC, 2007).  
 
Second, in relation to the affordable housing question, the former Office of Commonwealth 
Development (OCD) and the State Legislature attempted to address this dilemma through 
legislative changes, creating new institutional forms. The major attempts to do this built upon 
long-standing traditions of influencing market-based approaches and creating affordable 
housing. Thus, Chapter 40B, the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Law of 1969, has long 
required 10% of housing stock in each municipality to be set aside as affordable housing for low- 
and moderate-income families. In 2004 and 2005, however, the State Legislature passed 
amendments to the affordable housing statute that included certain ‘smart growth’ components. 
Chapter 40R, the Smart Growth Zoning and Housing Production Act addressed the issue of 
restrictive zoning in many of the city-region’s constituent municipalities that permit large, 
single-family homes on one-acre lots, while prohibiting multi-family homes, apartments and 
accessory apartments. The state aims to provide incentives for developments that use existing 
developed sites (not open space), or are in areas with existing infrastructure or near transit 
terminals. The Act also requires that 20% of housing at these sites has to be ‘affordable’. A 
transit-oriented development (TOD) program supports housing near public transit, cycling and 
pedestrian amenities, with the aim of managing parking, reducing traffic congestion and 
improving air quality. Finally, the Commonwealth Capital program, introduced in 2004, linked 
funding allocations for roads, sewers, parks and so on (nearly US $500 million annually) to a 
sustainable development checklist, intended to provide incentives for municipalities to alter land 
use practices. What we see here, then, is how a long-standing liberal tradition of state 
intervention to produce affordable housing has been retained through 40R in order to address 
contemporary dilemmas. At the same time, though, the Commonwealth Capital program and 
Smart Growth Tool Kit rely on market-based incentives. 
 
In the process of framing dilemmas economic development and housing-cost arguments are ones 
that have resonated most strongly with the beliefs of key state politicians and business interests. 
However, beliefs around smart growth only gained traction in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
amongst politicians. It was only when smart growth ideas gained both local and national 
prominence that planners felt able to incorporate these into policy perspectives in the guise of 
MetroFuture. The formation of MetroFuture involved a substantial effort to enrol other sets of 
local actors into these beliefs through a series of presentations, workshops, surveys and 
newspaper polls in order to incorporate a wide set of concerns. While this had some success, 
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with over 4,500 people and organizations involved in meetings and consultations, there has been 
limited business community engagement. As a result, Boston has not been able to create a strong 
culture of participation in land use or development affairs outside the typical pathways. This has 
meant difficulty for those engaged in the smart growth project to involve this set of actors in 
constructing a response to dilemmas. When dilemmas are addressed, therefore, it may be that 
only certain beliefs ‘matter’ in relation to Boston’s new institutional formations, or at least in the 
sense of active engagement. 
 
Devolving Growth Management in England’s South East 
 
Since the late 1990s, when the New Labour Government took control of the UK Parliament, the 
concept of sustainable development has had a conspicuous role in attempts to reconcile the 
challenges brought by rapid regional economic growth in London and South East England. From 
2010, under the subsequent Coalition government, the commitment to sustainable development 
continued as the London and South East continued to act as a main driver of the UK economy, 
albeit that the delivery mechanisms and targets employed altered.  It is also worth noting that the 
Central Government remains delegator of regional policy in the UK, which is why we are 
examining the London city region based on Central Government policy.  In this section we 
examine the rhetorical moves each government employed in order to manage the pressures of 
rapid growth in line with its understanding of the policy dilemma, party traditions, and the 
beliefs of different key actors. 
 
New Labour and Sustainable Development: Internalizing Externalities 
 
As the century came to a close, sustainable development in UK cities became a key response to 
the similar dilemma we have outlined in Boston - how does a city or region reconcile economic 
growth and environmental protection? The dilemma was especially acute in South East England, 
where population growth put extraordinary pressure on housing costs and quality of life issues, 
in the context of increasing housing scarcity and a slow planning process. As in Boston, the 
dilemma was framed as maintaining the region’s competitiveness and a similar policy response 
argued that developing a “sustainable city-region” could be an engine for economic growth, not a 
hindrance to it. In addition, this dovetailed with a policy shift away from regional redistribution 
as a source of competitiveness towards a greater emphasis on city-regions as drivers of the 
economy (While, Gibbs and Jonas, 2013).  The dilemma was captured in Kate Barker’s report on 
the ‘housing issue’ that exposed the tension between planning practices in local authorities and 
the time it takes to deliver housing to the market place. For Barker, there were issues around the 
relationship between the private sector as the main deliverer of housing, which may not accord 
with government objectives (Barker, 2004: i). Here, Barker, and many others, were taking aim at 
what they saw as an antiquated planning system which dated back to the Town and Country 
Planning Act of 1947 which, in many commentators’ views, gave local authorities far too much 
power in opening up – or not opening up – land for development. Thus politicians criticised the 
planning system as being outdated and overly burdensome for developers, as the following quote 
indicates: 
 
While there are policies to bring a higher level of professionalism to planning, the 
real problem is some of the ageing planners. These planners had lost their power 
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under Thatcher and wanted to go back to the old ways. Thus they needed to be given 
incentives to open up lands for housing through the local development frameworks  
(Personal communication, LDA, 2008). 
 
Using the language of interpretive institutionalism, the dilemma was how to maintain London 
and the South East’s competitiveness under conditions of a failing factor of production in the 
city-region i.e., urban socio-environmental quality of life.  New Labour viewed this dilemma in 
the tradition of Labour’s goal for redistribution and fairness. In order to address the dilemma, in 
1998 the then Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) commissioned the London 
“Starchitect” Richard Rogers to lead an Urban Task Force. Urban regeneration was to be guided 
by three key principles: design excellence, social well-being, and environmental responsibility. 
These principles come from the Labour party’s tradition of socialism, or distribution of wealth 
and quality of life among different social groups. This expression of values was stated in the 
subsequent ODPM’s Planning Policy Statement 1 (PPS 1) where the ODPM outlines four clear 
goals for developing sustainable cities: 
 
1. Progress that recognized the needs of everyone; 
2. Effective protection of the environment; 
3. Prudent use of natural resources, and; 
4. Maintenance of high and stable levels of economic growth and employment. 
 
A series of policy measures were announced and handed down to local authorities in order to 
respond to the perceived policy dilemmas (for a more in depth study of these institutional 
changes in the UK planning system see Krueger and Gibbs (2010) and Allmendinger (2011). 
One particular response was to shift thinking away from a public service tradition towards an 
economic focus: 
 
Folks were forced to think about resource allocations as economists, that was the 
place for the market. When externalities were identified, here was where the state 
would carve out space for institutional intervention (Interview, Former 
Communities and Local Government staff member, 2009).  
 
Finally the belief was that more housing would resolve much of the tensions if it were made 
available through a more efficient planning system and developed faster to meet growing 
demand, but while maintaining the traditional policy goals of the (New) Labour Party. To further 
illustrate this point, we will look at some of the subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition Government reforms and how they extended these provisions given the different 
traditions and beliefs they were informed by. 
 
The Coalition Government and Sustainable Urban Development 
 
The Coalition Government partially repealed Labour’s Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 
of 2004 and introduced the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) in 2012.  The London 
Plan, first introduced in 2004, was also amended to comply with the NPPF.  The NPPF added 
new goals to the planning system, with the top three focused on economic growth. These are: 
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1. Building a strong, competitive economy; 
2. Ensuring the vitality of town centres; 
3. Supporting a prosperous rural economy. 
 
While the Coalition Government developed its own definition of sustainable development in the 
NPPF, this also stresses the Government’s belief in the ‘growth imperative’: 
 
“the purpose of planning is to help achieve sustainable development. Sustainable 
means ensuring that better lives for ourselves don’t mean worse lives for future 
generations. Development means growth. We must accommodate the new ways 
by which we will earn our living in a competitive world. We must house a rising 
population, which is living longer and wants to make new choices” (NPPF 2012, 
page ii). 
 
The NPPF abolished Regional Development Agencies as a tier in the planning regime. This 
decentralised planning from the regional scale to the local scale through Local Enterprise 
Partnerships. Through the Localism Act of 2011, Central Government called for local planning 
organizations to become more involved in neighbourhood planning practice. The Act also wound 
up the London Development Agency which had been responsible for development across 
London and responsibility passed to the Greater London Authority, established in 2000, in 
conjunction with the London boroughs.   This may sound like a more democratic approach than 
under the previous regime and clearly defines those organizations accountable for planning 
decisions. However, the devolved response was limited given that the NPPF also introduced a 
number of caveats in favour of development.  For example, the Planning Inspectorate (Planning 
Inspectorate, 2012) published guidance regarding the approval of local plans: 
 
The Council ... will always work proactively with applicants jointly to find 
solutions which mean that [planning] proposals can be approved wherever 
possible, and to secure development that improves the economic, social and 
environmental conditions in the area. Planning applications that accord with the 
policies in this Local Plan (and, where relevant, with policies in neighbourhood 
plans) will be approved without delay, unless material considerations indicate 
otherwise. Where there are no policies relevant to the application or relevant 
policies are out of date at the time of making the decision then the Council will 
grant permission unless material considerations indicate otherwise. 
 
Coalition responses to the dilemma thus supported those which were defined by New Labour - 
efficiency in the approval process, pressure on planning authorities to approve development 
plans, and on changing material conditions. First, local authorities were required to “always work 
proactively with applicants”. This keeps the decision making more ‘local’ because the appeal 
process to regional authorities has been abolished. The only opportunity for appeal is to the 
Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG), which seems to be a decidedly 
‘pro-growth’ approach given that DCLG was the organization that promulgated the NPPF in the 
first place. Similarly, the language in the policy states that: “planning proposals can be approved 
wherever possible.” Then, in the second clause, it states “and to secure development that…” This 
is written as if improvement to the economic, social and environmental conditions to an area is 
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aspirational and not a requirement. Second, the language of ‘material conditions’ is again 
employed. Here, material conditions are not well-defined, thus, in the case of a conflict between 
the interests of the local authority and the project proponent, DCLG are the final arbiter of what 
constitutes material conditions. Thus, while the local authorities have primacy in local planning 
activities, even down to the neighbourhood scale, they are constrained by the more explicit 
language to grant planning permission. 
 
Support for this argument exists elsewhere in the NPPF which calls for a significant boost in the 
supply of housing approved by local planning authorities, provision of development sites for five 
years’ worth of housing needs, and longer term housing projections. Such provision was seen as 
especially acute in London and the South East where there were shortages of affordable housing.  
However, as with the clause regarding improvement to environmental conditions outlined above, 
the NPPF suggests that affordable housing is welcome, but not required. Affordable housing 
must be provided on site “unless off-site provision or a financial contribution of broadly 
equivalent value” can be obtained” (NPPF, 2012: 12-13). Overall, market-based housing, 
favoured by private developers, receives the greatest emphasis. 
 
In summary, the goal of New Labour policy was to create development markets and, in principle, 
monitor externalities. By contrast, the Coalition Government’s goal was to re-emphasise the need 
for rapid development by requiring that plans be adopted, setting housing targets without the 
requirement for an affordability component, and limiting the appeal process to one arbiter. This 
analysis of the Coalition Government’s policies illustrates how differences in tradition affect the 
response, even when there is an agreement on the dilemma. Whereas New Labour sought to 
promote explicitly its social goals and created a set of institutional conditions to support them, 
the Coalition Government employed its own tradition of market-oriented approaches, instead of 
command and control, to regulate property markets and modernize planning.  Despite these 
different approaches, the major dilemma of housing provision remained (and remains) 
preeminent.  Devolution of responsibility to local authorities and, in the case of London, to the 
Greater London Authority and the London boroughs, has not produced any notable increase in 
affordable housing provision (see Mayor of London, 2017). 
 
Reinforcing the Centralized State Apparatus in Luxembourg 
 
Finally, we turn to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. This case further illustrates the role of 
tradition in shaping actors’ understanding of dilemmas. Located between Belgium, France, and 
Germany, Luxembourg is a sovereign small state whose economic activities have social spatial 
effects that spill across the national borders into all three neighbouring countries (Chilla and 
Schulz, 2015), forming a cross-border urban agglomeration (Carr, forthcoming), or “enclave 
space” (Hesse, 2014). Due to this cross-border character, and because Luxembourg’s policies 
have direct impacts in the border regions, there is good reason to examine socio-political and 
institutional responses generated in the regions beyond Luxembourg's borders.  However, the 
focus here is on national policy-making, how policy-makers construct their dilemmas, and how 
these are embedded in traditions that are specific to the Grand Duchy. 
 
For decades following World War II, Luxembourg relied on iron ore mining, metal processing, 
and value added steel products as the basis of its economy. Economic restructuring, however, left 
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Luxembourg with a much smaller ‘boutique’ steel industry and the nation had to look for a new 
basis of accumulation. The cross-border urban agglomeration observable today is the 
consequence of political economic strategies that aimed at attracting European Union offices, 
encouraging development of the financial, service and R&D sectors, and most recently 
development as an important node in the international geographies of both IT development and 
the space industry. As a result, the country has been managing continual growth pressure since 
the late 1990s.  
 
As with the other two cases, the key dilemma in Luxembourg is how to manage the challenges 
associated with rapid growth while maintaining quality of life (Affolderbach and Carr, 2016; 
Hesse and Becker, 2010).  Inward migration of both labour and businesses have heated the 
private property market, and driven up the value of land. The consequences of this are illustrated 
in the following quotation:  
 
The pressure is very high. The pressure doubles every year. You wouldn't believe, 
for example, that we just organized a workshop for the administration on how to 
deal with construction and demolition waste. The amount of waste that has to be 
disposed of is increasing, dramatically, each year. In part, this has to do with the 
fact that everything has to be built densely. But what about parking? What do they 
do about that? They build two, three, or four underground levels. This situation is 
not going to improve. So, there are severe consequences and costs associated with 
the pressure. It means, too, that the pressure on the property development is 
extremely high, and come hell or high water, properties will be exploited as far as 
possible. And that drives the prices higher up again (Interview, Architect, 2012). 
 
While property owners welcomed increased property values, higher prices proved problematic 
for renters and first-time buyers looking for a certain standard of living. Many workers, including 
Luxembourgish citizens, find it more affordable to settle in the neighbouring regions of Lorraine 
(France), Rhineland Palatinate (Germany) or Wallonia (Belgium), where the combined costs of 
housing and commuting is still cheaper than housing locations inside Luxembourg (Christmann, 
2017). The resulting settlement patterns lead to new dilemmas, because increased numbers of 
cross-border commuters put strain on existing transport infrastructures that connect the border 
regions to Luxembourg. Jammed highways and slow and over-packed commuter trains remain 
the norm. 
 
Within the Duchy, policy makers were concerned that continued economic growth and its 
impacts on the built environment would compromise green space, which was (a) tied to quality 
of living associated with single family home ownership; and (b) a threat to local biodiversity; 
and (c) perceived to be in limited quantity. However, these concerns are tempered by prevailing 
values and traditions. These include desires to own a single-family house and some land, to 
maintain a certain quality of living, and to retain green space as a part of one's living 
environment. This is reinforced by a government that upholds the ideology of home ownership 
as key to local social cohesion.  A sense of these traditions is indicated by the following 
quotations: 
 
Our government declared it as a specific goal […] that private home ownership is 
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the best instrument available in order to maintain social cohesion (Interview, 
Government Official from the Ministry of Housing, 2012). 
 
One difference between Luxembourg and other countries is that we have, 
probably by far, the highest proportion of owners and a very low proportion of 
renters. And, the normal Luxembourgish ideal is to have a single-family house 
with green around it and the next neighbour perhaps 100 m away. So, social 
housing, for example, which normally means that many people will live together 
sharing a smaller property is against the Luxembourg ideal (Interview, 
Representative from Caritas, 2012). 
 
I look back at my parents' generation. They built a large house on a large piece of 
property, which was comparatively cheap at the time. That was the fashion in the 
1970s. Today, those houses are certainly seen as luxury homes. But in the 1990s, 
a lot of immigrants arrived who could afford very large houses. Those who came 
to work in the banks, for example. They earned a lot of money and bought 
gigantic houses, and this, of course caused the market to heat up (Interview, 
Mortgage Broker, 2012). 
 
Luxembourg has a regulatory system in place that controls land use and development. This 
system is organized over a two-tiered government whereby, generally, the central government 
oversees international relations and general issues of national interest, and the 106 municipalities 
manage schooling, waste and water, forestry, and land-use zoning. Land use is regulated by, first, 
the “Housing Pact” (Pacte Logement, PL) (ML, 2008), which redistributes central government 
funds to the municipalities according to population growth indicators. Second, and more 
importantly, municipal land use plans (plan d'aménagement general, PAG) need to be drawn up 
by each municipality, submitted and approved by various departments of the central government. 
With the exception of the City of Luxembourg, municipalities are generally sparsely staffed and 
often contract planning work out to architects, developers, or real estate agents to complete the 
necessary plans and carry out the procedures (Interviews, Municipal Official, 2012; Architects, 
2012). The overall procedure has been the source of much frustration among the municipalities: 
 
For me [a lawyer], it is genius. It is impossible to understand anything at all. I 
need a lawyer here who is doing nothing else all day except paying attention that 
we are aware of all the different laws and so on. I think that if they continue like 
this, in five years, it will be impossible to build a house without a lawyer […] I 
saw the Minister at a meeting, and I told him, 'Listen, this is impossible, what you 
are doing,' and he told me, 'Yes, this way I have the possibility to cancel nearly 
any PAG,' and I answered him, 'And so do I.' And from this moment on, it is a 
national sport to attack any PAG (Interview, Housing Lawyer, 2012). 
 
Not only are procedures complicated, but plans are often sent back to the municipalities with 
objections from different departments within the central government that conflict with one 
another (Interviews, Municipal Officials and Architects, 2012). This frustration over procedures 
that are seen as too long and non-transparent, leaves many suspicious of central government and 
what their intentions might actually be (Carr, 2014; Hesse, 2015; Becker et al., 2016). 
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In parallel to this process, many in central government began voicing the opinion that new 
visions, laws, and plans were needed to meet the new challenges of the times, to address changes 
in the structure of Luxembourg’s economy, and the associated dilemmas of growth pressure. In 
the early 2000s the Ministry of the Interior (Ministère de l’Intérieur, MI) introduced the notion of 
national spatial planning, with a strong central government role for the Department of Spatial 
Planning (Département de l’aménagement du territoire, DATer). Sustainable development was 
seen as the antidote to problems of growth pressure (Carr, 2011). 
 
The most substantive expression of the Duchy’s commitment to sustainable development came 
with the publication of the “National Plan for Sustainable Development” (Plan National pour un 
Développment Durable, PNDD) (Ministère du Développement durable et des Infrastructures 
(MDDI) & Spangenberg, 2011). This was Luxembourg’s response to the Rio conference and was 
the final product of over a decade of internal deliberation, revision, and support throughout the 
MDDI (Carr, 2013). Subsequently the government published the “National Spatial Plan” 
(Programme Directeur d’Aménagement de territoire, PDAT) (MI, 2003), which provided a 
vision for Luxembourg’s future spatial development. It called for a polycentric and 
complementary relationship between urban and rural regions with higher density settlements 
built closer to centres of economic activity and nodes of development connected by public 
transport. Those involved in the development of the PDAT claimed that the strategy would 
deliver the optimal use of space and resources and thereby mitigate growth pressures, curb 
sprawl, preserve green space and deliver sustainable development (MI, 2003: 17). 
 
In theory, the PDAT and PNDD might have appealed to residents and stakeholders as these 
documents spoke to issues of optimizing growth in spatial terms while maintaining standards of 
living and associated relationships to green space. However, while the PNDD was potentially 
damaging to the business-as-usual approach to property development and growth, it was never 
foreseen to have any legal traction. It was meant to serve merely as an information piece. The 
PDAT, by contrast, was earmarked as a possible solution to spatial planning problems that would 
obtain legal ratification. However, it ultimately failed to gain full public support not only because 
of the intractable procedures that came along with it, but also because its supporters never 
managed to achieve a sense of trust among the municipalities: 
 
The Sector Plans, they are supposed to be finished soon and I am really afraid that 
we will get yet another dictate from above, while not a single word has been 
uttered to the Municipalities. The Municipalities are vying for their rights to self-
determination, and I believe that there is going to be some friction (Interview, 
Member of the Green Party, 2012). 
 
After more than ten years in the waiting, the legal grounding for the PDAT was announced. 
Krieger (2014), a well-known local advocate for property owners, published a commentary in the 
largest daily newspaper, Luxemburger Wort, claiming that the ministry was attempting to shut 
down public debate, as municipal authorities and citizens would have only three weeks to 
respond to the central government's new spatial planning law. Within months, the law was tossed 
out. The result was ultimately a stalemate over land use planning between government and 
private actors, defaulting to business-as-usual approaches to property development and growth 
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pressure, i.e. continued speculation to the benefit of land owners, traffic problems, threats to 
green space, uneven disparities between labour and Luxembourgish residents. Thus, despite a 
tradition of strong central government, the inviolable position of developers and large land 
owners was left unchallenged. 
 
Given that procedures of the PAG were already in place to regulate land use, an outsider could 
ask what the point of the whole PDAT exercise was, especially since it, along with its message 
of sustainable development, was seen by some a means of scaling up authority over land-use to 
the central government. Was it a genuine attempt to bring about change that would be in line 
with Rio objectives? Was it an attempt to rein in and centralize control over land use, and steer 
profits towards certain networks? Was the whole exercise simply a political charade, or "sport" 
as one interviewee named it, to make it feel like something would happen only to veil business as 
usual practices?  While the answers are perhaps unclear, the story of Luxembourg remains that of 
an economic ‘boomtown’ that adopted the principles of sustainable development to internalize 
the externalities of rapid growth, especially those externalities believed to compromise quality of 
life. In this way, Luxembourg’s institutional responses to growth pressures were no different 
than our other two examples of ‘smart growth’ in the US and ‘sustainable development’ in the 
UK, as the rhetorical moves made involved playing on local traditions in order to rein in 
authority over land use and develop future markets. While on paper, the PDAT claimed to aim 
for sustainable development, in practice it aimed to preserve national sovereignty and quality of 
life without disturbing associated systems of private property and governance. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our focus in this paper has been to examine how three different city-regions sought to manage 
the contradictions of rapid growth and, in particular, their perceived need to maintain economic 
growth trajectories while preserving environment, quality of life, and issues such as affordable 
housing, sprawl, and increased commuting. Theoretically we have argued that an interpretive 
institutionalist account helps elucidate how the actions of actors in particular places reflect both 
their inherited histories and the ways that they shape these through their own cultural and 
material contexts. A key starting point has been ‘struggles over different ways of conceiving of 
and responding to constructed dilemmas’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2005: 180). Thus, this initial focus 
helps to show how dilemmas, and the ways in which they are constructed, have forced actors to 
reconsider beliefs and traditions. At the same time though, those same beliefs and traditions have 
helped shape institutional responses to address the dilemmas. Solutions to dilemmas will be 
strategically selected, but not in some pure ideological form, they take the shape of traditional—
and dominant—ideas and prevailing institutional structures. Change is most likely to come about 
when proponents can demonstrate continuity with pre-existing traditions. Hence, those 
competing ideas that best fit into existing traditions and practices may be acceptable, whereas 
more radical alternatives may not. 
 
In our case study examples, the dilemmas share much common ground (Table 2). Concerns over 
sprawl, housing affordability, open space preservation, congestion, and quality of life combined 
with fears over the loss of global economic competitiveness were prevalent in Boston, South 
East England, and Luxembourg. Yet the ways in which these dilemmas have been addressed and 
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the institutional forms that emerged to implement policy solutions have varied beyond simple 
paradigms. In Boston, the response to the dilemmas has been shaped by local traditions of 
political fragmentation and a longstanding concern for affordable housing. While the extent of 
political fragmentation may be exaggerated (see Horan, 2009), it still acts as a local tradition that 
needs to be accommodated through dialogue and community engagement in the MetroFuture 
project. Similarly, while the affordable housing agenda may be a relic of a more liberal past, it 
has taken on a new importance in local concerns over retaining global competitiveness and 
attractiveness to new economy firms and employees. The adoption of smart growth as a response 
to dilemmas has so far managed to build on traditions and provide the medium through which 
differing beliefs can largely be reconciled. Whether this can continue to be a valid response, 
given the tensions between beliefs, remains to be seen. In the UK, there were similar dilemmas, 
which were especially prevalent in the rapidly growing economy of London and the South East 
England. Here though, traditions of redistribution and fairness under a Labour government 
shaped the institutional responses largely through changes to the planning system. As with 
Boston, these changes were increasingly market-driven, especially with a change to a Coalition 
government (and even more so subsequently with a change to a Conservative government), 
although in the UK change has been a top-down process, with central government imposing 
changes in planning regulations on local areas, reflecting longstanding traditions of central-local 
relations in the UK. This devolved approach, in contrast to the Boston experience, imposed 
market reform obliquely. For example, in the UK the central government established housing 
targets for local authorities. While, prima facie, this may not seem to be a ‘market’ reform it has 
the implications of one because it forces local authorities to develop a minimum amount of 
housing or, as a consequence, lose some central government funding. Thus, local authorities 
have to ‘open up’ their regulatory process to satisfy this demand. In Luxembourg, the dilemmas 
have an additional dimension where congestion and planning concerns have been shaped by 
Luxembourg’s changing economic role and particularly by the resultant inward commuting 
patterns from other countries. However, despite central government attempts to impose strong 
planning and land use measures, the reality has been the continued prevalence of local traditions 
of government at commune level and a resultant lack of transparency in land use planning 
decisions that have often favoured local elites and market development. Furthermore, as a result 
of the government focusing on getting its command and control regime ‘right’ the market altered 
space so much that these goals are obsolete. 
 
Examining three cases, rather than a single one, provides conceptual insights into how dilemmas, 
though similar across space, are managed differently in place. We believe the merits of an 
interpretive approach lie in its focus on the ‘complex and continuous process of interpretation, 
conflict, and activity that produces ever-changing patterns of rule’ (Bevir, 2006: 11) and its 
ability to help explain institutional fluidity and dynamism. These qualities can help to inform the 
‘cultural economies’ literature outlined in the introduction. First, interpretive institutionalism 
provides the conceptual linkages to understand institutional relations in ways that one can 
observe the broad cultural characteristics that inform the development and evolution of 
economies. Hence, it also provides an empirical window into how actors who are part of broader 
traditions, with beliefs of their own, shape the understanding of, and responses to, policy 
dilemmas. These perceived dilemmas, in turn, can shape and reshape economic governance. 
Importantly, from the view of North’s (2015) work, it can reveal how capitalist social relations 
are reproduced, or, how new ideas, such as those consistent with diverse economies, can shape 
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new forms of economic development. For example, one could explore how non-capitalist ideas 
might emerge through beliefs that alter traditions. Interpretive institutionalism also provides the 
conceptual footing to reveal the multiple and different causal pathways that shape responses to 
perceived dilemmas. 
 
In the future, research will be needed to examine new governance failures that will play into a 
situation where beliefs and traditions have evolved through smart growth policies, which will 
lead to different ways of framing, and responding to, these new dilemmas (Bevir, 2006). We are 
already beginning to see these at the local level through initiatives such as the transition towns 
and sharing movements. There is also room to expand the conceptual scope of interpretive 
institutionalism. For example, our work here, and that of Bevir and Rhodes, is focused on formal 
politics and political institutions. The scope could be widened to examine the informal politics 
that shapes these concepts of dilemmas, traditions, and beliefs. 
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Table 1. Analytical Concepts of Interpretive Institutionalism 
 
Concept Operant 
Dilemmas Perceived paradox of existing policy. These stand in opposition to 
existing beliefs but are understood in a particular ideological or political 
tradition. Agents, or coalitions of them, situated in different traditions 
construct these contradictions.  
Traditions This is the social context in which actors exercise their reason and actions 
(e.g., ‘Old’ Labour and ‘New’ Labour outlined in the text). Individuals are 
thus not trans-historical actors, but have a sort of bounded rationality.  
Beliefs Offer analytical priority as to how individuals construct their world, 
including the ways they understand their location, the norms that affect 
them and their interests. 
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Table 2. Dilemmas, Traditions and Responses across three City-Regions 
 
City-
Region 
Dilemmas Traditions Beliefs Responses 
Boston 
How does a city or 
region grow, 
maintain 
competitiveness, 
attract new 
economy workers, 
and maintain 
quality of life 
 
WHILE 
 
dealing with 
planning 
consequences 
housing costs, 
sprawl, transport 
inequality 
 
 
Concern for 
affordable housing, 
Political 
fragmentation 
(Home Rule) 
 
 Smart Growth 
South 
East 
 
Tradition of fairness 
in distribution of 
wealth 
 
 
More housing, 
with a more 
efficient 
planning 
system 
 
Design excellence, 
social well-being, 
and environmental 
responsibility 
 
Sustainable city-
region could be an 
engine for 
economic growth, 
not a hindrance 
 
Market driven 
Greater
Luxem-
bourg 
Managing as a city-
region and as a small 
state 
 
Maintenance of 
international 
relations by higher 
level authorities. 
 
Protecting private 
property 
 
Protecting 
centralized 
regulation 
New spatial 
planning laws 
 
Sustainable 
development 
Attempted 
centralization 
(through the 
PDAT) 
 
Market-based 
solutions to 
housing problems 
(PL) 
 
